On
June
20, the day the French sighted Crete, Nelson already
was ,"half-way between Crete and Alexandria. He sent the
Mutzne
ahead with Captain Hardy; all Hardy
could find at Alexandria
was
a few dilapidated Turkish warships. Three days later Nelson himself,
within his entire squadron, anchored off
Alexandria and disconsolately
surveyed the empty harbor. By now, his embarrassment was great indeed:
the French must have sailed west after all. Close to nervous collapse,
Nelson
ordered
his squadron to set sail for Crete; the English had barely left
when, on
June 27, while the preparations were in

| "The
French have no business here in Egypt, and we are not at war with them"
said Kuraiym...." In any event, you British cannot stay in our waters,
and we have no plausible reason to authorize you to do so. Take water
and victual for your ships, if you have to, but go away. If the French
really think of invading our country, as you pretend, we shall thwart their
undertaking."
"You'll
see what will happen "replied Captain Hardy to Kuraiym ,
"and you'll be sorry you refused our help. " |
progress,
Captain
Hardy sailed into the port of Alexandria with the
Mutine.
He was at first mistaken for a Frenchman. Even when this error was cleared
up,
Muhammad Kuraiym, the commandant of the city, who came
to ask what were the Englishman's intentions, refused to accept their assistance
against the French. Distrusting all Europeans alike, he cagily pretended
ignorance. "It is impossible" he told them. In Kuraiym's
particular case, the Englishman's prophecy assuredly proved accurate. It
may be said with equal assurance that it was not Kuraiym's impotent
defiance which kept the English from anchoring outside the harbor. Yet,
unless Niquwlah al-Turkiyy (Nicholas the Turk) invented this conversation
out of whole cloth, a puzzling question arises. If the English thought
that there was a chance of the French fleet reaching
Alexandria
after they themselves did (and this possibility is implied in Hardy's
exchange with Kuraiym), why did not Nelson
wait off Alexandria
for at least a couple of days? What made him give up so suddenly his conviction,
expressed in dispatch after dispatch, that Egypt and India
were the goals of the French? For lack of a better explanation, one must
assume that the motive was more psychological than strategic: in the heat
of the chase, he could not bring himself to idle away two days at a standstill
and risk the chance of his prey escaping in another direction.
In
any event, when the English left on June 29, the tricolor was still
flying atop the house of the French consul, Magallon, a nephew of
the Charles Magallon who perhaps had done more than any other man
to instigate the expedition and who, at the moment, was aboard
L'Orient.
L'Orient;
the
flagship of the French armada
On
June
27, after nightfall, the frigate La Junon was ordered
to the stern of L'Orient. "It would be difficult",
says Denon, who was aboard the frigate, to convey an exact idea
of what we felt as we approached that inner sanctum of power, dictating
its orders amidst 300 sail, in the mystery and silence of the night,
with only the moon lighting the spectacle just enough to let us take it
in. We were about 500 of us on deck; one could have heard the buzzing
of a fly. (1) Ordered
aboard the flagship, the captain of the frigate received his instructions:
he was to sail to Alexandria, reconnoiter the defenses, pick up
the French consul, and bring him back. La Junon
set off immediately;
she sighted the coast of Egypt on the 29th at dawn, in the
afternoon of the same day, the French frigate set ahead by Bonaparte,
entered the harbor of Alexandria.
The
view did not cheer the troops. "Look!" a wit among them remarked
to his neighbor, pointing at the dismal, barren coast, "There are the
six acres of land they've promised you" (2)
At 1 p.m., the frigate reached Alexandria and anchored several
miles offshore. A lieutenant was dispatched in a launch to fetch
the consul; while waiting for his return, Denon
sketched the distant
view of the fort, the mosques and minarets of the city. As he drew, he
indulged himself in daydreams of Alexandria's past glories daydreams
soon to be dispelled by the realities of a small town whose population
had shrunk to about
6,000. The emissary and the consul having returned
about midnight,
La Junon
set sail. When, at 7 a.m.
the following day, she pulled alongside L'Orient, the calm
weather had given way to a brisk north wind which soon became a gale. The
French fleet, both warships and transports, was bobbing on the waves in
chaotic confusion.
Magallon and Denon went aboard the flagship
to report to
Bonaparte. The main news, of course, was that the English
squadron had just left Alexandria and might be prowling in the neighborhood.
Bonaparte's
countenance, so Denon assures us, remained unaltered.
Brueys
supervising the landing : " The population of Alexandria was in a state
of ferment and apprehension."
Although
the French armada stunned the people of Alexandria by its hugeness
when it hove in sight, its appearance in itself caused little surprise.
Reports of the capture of Malta had preceded it, and, as Brueys
reported to the Minister of Marine, "the population was in a state of
ferment and apprehension (3),
There had been a general rush to arms; repairs were made on the moth-eaten
fortifications; there were scarcely any soldiers, but a militia was formed,
and the Mamluwk al-kashif of al-Bihayrah Province
rounded up some Bedouin tribes to assist in the defense: all these measures
were more frenzied than effectual.
On
the following day-July 1-the armada sighted Pompey's Pillar,
which then was the outstanding landmark of Alexandria. The proximity
of the English fleet forced an immediate choice upon Bonaparte:
either he must land his army that very day or he must seek safety in one
or both of the city's harbors. It was clear from the younger Magallon's
report that a landing in Alexandria itself was out of the question
without a battle. The fleet might fight its way into one of the harbors,
but only at great risk, the approaches to both ports being narrow and tricky,
especially in heavy weather; there was a danger that the battleships might
run aground. The alternative a landing east or west of Alexandria-presented
equal difficulties. The ideal landing place was Abuw Qiyr Bay, about
fifteen miles to the east. To land there, however, would waste precious
time, because of the distance, and it was exactly the spot where the enemy
would expect a landing. The beach of Marabuwt, a fishing village
about eight miles to the west, was preferable from the landlubber's
point of view, but not from the seaman's. Admiral Brueys raised
vehement objections to it. The operation could not begin before afternoon
and would take all night; the sea was ugly; the coast and coastal waters
were uncharted. It would be better not to land the same day but to wait
until the following morning, since Nelson was not likely to return
for some time.
As
it happened, Brueys was right (Nelson returned only a month later),
but he was overruled by the landlubber. Bonaparte, says Bourrienne,
"listened to these arguments with impatience and ill humor. He replied
brusquely, " Admiral, we have no time to waste. Luck grants me three
days, no more. If I don't take advantage of them, we're lost". (4)
Thus the question was decided on a gamble, decision to land the troops,
despite all risks, was the only rational one.
While
the French fleet was still off Alexandria, casting terror into the
hearts of those ashore, the Turkish commander of a caravel that was anchored
in the port sent an officer to L'Orient with a gift of two
sheep and an inquiry as to what the French were doing there. The Turk was
handed a copy of the Arabic proclamation, already printed, addressed to
the people of
Egypt (see attached picture on the right).
He shook his head; he could not read Arabic, he said (probably he could
not read Turkish either); the proclamation was translated for him by
Venture.
At every disobliging mention of the Mamaliyk beys, the visitor
leaped with joy; he requested more copies of the proclamation to distribute,
consumed quantities of coffee and sweets, and left with a letter from Bonaparte
to his commander. "I shall be in Alexandria tomorrow', wrote the
General.
"You need not fear anything. You belong to our great friend, the Sultan:
act accordingly. But, if you display the least hostility toward the French
army, I shall treat you as an enemy, and you will be to blame for it, for
it is far from my heart's intentions to do so." (5)
It is doubtful whether the Turkish commander was impressed with Bonaparte's
sincerity, but he kept his own counsel and did nothing.
The
landing on al-Murabit beach. The boats received one by one and at
random the soldiers descending from the vessels
The
landing operations off al-Murabit beach began about
noon. Of the five divisions that made up the army, those commanded
by Desaix,
Menou, and Reynier were on transports,
anchored about three miles offshore; the divisions commanded by
Kléber
and Bon were on the battleships, forming an arc at about twice that
distance from the beach. The approaches to the shore were obstructed by
rocks and reefs; the sea grew steadily worse, and it was eight o'clock
when the first troops reached land. The operation turned out a night-long
inferno. Many of the soldiers had to be lowered into the launches and longboats
by ropes. The sea was covered with capsized boats, and the screams of the
men could be heard above the noise of the waves; very few of the men could
swim; everybody-soldiers, sailors, and marines-was desperately seasick.
Some of the boats took eight
hours to row three miles. It
seems a miracle that only nineteen men were drowned; this, at least,
is the figure given by Bonaparte, who may have minimized it.

CLICK HERE FOR THE

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FOOTNOTES
EPISODE
FOUR
1-
Denon, Dominique Vivant, Baron. Voyages dens la Basse et la Haute Egypte
pendant les campagnes de Bonaparte en 1798 et 1799. vol. I, p.20. London,
1807.
2-
Ibid., vol. I, p.21.
3-
Bourrienne, Louis-Antoine Fauvelet de. Mémoires. vol. I, p. 258..
Paris, n.d.
4-
Correspondence de l'armée française en Egypte. (French edition)
Paris, Year IV, p.190.
5-
Ibid.
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